Export of special operations knowledge by training

Arms exports are controlled by the Dutch government using a number of regimes: national, European and global. The items controlled include Military and Dual Use equipment, Sanctioned products (normally not controlled, but they fall under license when contributing to military-industrial capacity of a sanctioned country), Strategic services (like the supply of software and technology by e.g. phone of email, providing technological assistance and brokering), and the transit of products for torture.

There is a range of criteria to be met before a export gets a green light. One can question if this control is strict enough, but at least there is some form of control. But there is also military technology which does not fall under any of these regimes.

Recently the Dutch special forces (KCT) provided training of Ivorian Special Forces in counter terrorism. It raises the question if control on the export of military to military operational know-how is not of similar or even of higher importance than on arms export. And consequently if those training and exercise missions should not be as severely scrutinised and controlled by parliaments or bodies to prevent mishaps. Exercises and training are undeniable the transit of military expertise or assistance. In this case: “(…) the Ivorians were, among other things, made familiar with Hostage Release Operations (HRO). Think of anti-terrorism actions in, for example, hotels, houses, other types of buildings or the jungle. The Ivorians had requested this $because of the growing criminality in their country,” as it is worded on the website of the Dutch MoD (underlining author).^I Arrests from houses was part of the training. Manoeuvre in the jungle was a second topic for lessons, reconnaissance and cooperation with snipers a third. The online exercise reports includes photographs and clips.

The training was part of a larger regional program of training and exercise, the multi-nation special warfare exercise Flintlock 2024 (see clips), with participation of African countries such as: Benin^II, Chad, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunsia. Approximately 1,300 participants from nearly 30 international and African nations participated in Flintlock 2024. As with the transfer of military items, gaining regional military influence is an important goal for knowledge exporting countries. Cooperation with the crème de crème of the foreign militaries expands the power of Western countries in Northwest Africa. Special Forces “(…) will always maintain a pivotal role in the great power competition. (…) Much of the great power competition is taking place in the obscure domains and in regions around the world where gaining access and influence to populations and regional governments is key” wrote a military expert in a evaluation. But some of these countries would be considered controversial destinations for arms exports, so why is restrictive control not an issue when military knowledge for repression is exported?

Ivory Coast is not exactly a paradise of human rights. The US State Department reported in 2023 that: Significant human rights issues included credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including censorship; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly; serious government corruption; and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons. The government did not consistently take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses. The Dutch special forces training offers more tools for repression, although claims to also train on making arrests in juridically correct ways.

Did someone already question the wisdom of this deployment? The wiki on Flintlock states: “There is concern, however, that forces trained by American Special Forces go on to use their new skills to commit war crimes in their home countries and would pose a threat to the stability of the regions.” It is time for more control and scrutiny of what knowledge is provided to whom and how this fits in a ethic security policy.

Control does not have to start from scratch. The United States has a long running debate on policyaround military training, for examle on the International Military Education and Training program (IMET). It is defined as “security assistance” which includes, in the US definition, “military assistance, economic support funding, military education and training, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance, etc.” According to the standard US military handbook, the Green Book, this falls under control of the US Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Control Act.

What policies exist in the European nations on this issue is difficult to find out. In the Netherlands there is no established policy al all and in 2021 the Dutch Minister of Defence answered to Parliamentary questions that it is “not customary to inform the House about Dutch participation in military exercises.” But to implement a more mature policy is no rocket science. Like the export of military technological knowledge, military training can and must also be measured along the lines of an ethical foreign policy. The criteria of arms export control regimes can be simply used as point of departure.

Notes:
I this clearly connects to the goal of the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) which has established itself (with one of the eight African risk cells) in Ivory Coast focussing on risk analysis for border control capacity and prevention of cross-border crime. See: Frontex celebrates “expanding footprint” beyond the EU in report on third country cooperation, Statewatch, 18 August 2022. In a paper written August 2024 by Nigrian author Ngozi Louis Uzomah of the University of Nigeria it reads: “the use of EU‐funded technological projects for border management infringes on the historical cross‐border mobility in North and West Africa which is essential for socioeconomic exchanges and escaping conflicts.” (See also).

II The involvement of Benin was mentioned in Egmont Policy Brief 361 | What’s brewing in Benin? Security collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea. It states: “In the current climate of anti-Western sentiments on the African continent, and in particular in West Africa, overburdening a state with Western military presence may weaken the government and result in both a political and military backlash if security forces and/or opposition actors do not align with the government’s policy.”

Martin Broek December 2024